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Carl Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth in the
International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum.

Translation & Introduction by G. L. Ulmen. Telos Press
Publishing, 2006.
Carl Schmitt (1888-1985) was a German jurist who bears
comparison to Heidegger both in eminence and biography.
He was one of those respectable intellectuals of the Right
who offered their services as an ideological clarifier to the
Nazi regime, only to find that the Nazis really were not
much interested in clarity or at least not in any clarity that
Schmitt was equipped to provide. He is best known in the
English-speaking world for his definition of the sovereign as
the agency with the authority to make an exception, for the
friend/enemy distinction, and for the principle that the real
law is what happens at the Ernstfall, at the point where a
concrete decision is made.
Schmitt was an anticonstitutionalist, meaning he tended
to regard written constitutions as epiphenomena, but by no
means a nihilist. The last point comes through very strongly
in this book, The Nomos of the Earth, written in Berlin during
the Second World War. (This edition contains an Appendix
written during the early 1950s, plus the translator's useful
introduction.) As the translator suggests, though the text
nowhere says so explicitly, The Nomos was originally
intended to formulate the theoretical basis for a German
Grofiraum in Europe, a sphere of influence analogous to the
Monroe Doctrine's demarcation of the Western Hemisphere
for the United States. The book we actually have, however, is a
description of the Eurocentric, global system of international
law that developed after the discovery of the New World,
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and that Schmitt argues, with some reason, ended at the
beginning of the 20 century.
This book contains what must be some of the most
hilarious assertions in the history of jurisprudence. Thus, we
learn that the Belgians were the ones who finally destroyed
the public international law of Europe, and that the 18 century partition of Poland was systemically appropriate
because the Polish government did not exercise sufficient
control over its territory to constitute a state. Nonetheless,
the book is valuable for its clear exposition of the thesis that
the nation is an entity that makes sense only in a larger legal
context. Indeed, at this writing, the book is topical: its outline
of the future nomos of the planet as a choice among world
government, maritime hegemony, or multiple Grofiraume is
pretty much the set of choices that we find in geopolitical
assessments today.
"Nomos" is a Greek word universally translated
"law" in English, "/ex" in Latin, and, usually, "Gesetz" in
German. Schmitt takes issue with these equivalences, and
especially the last. "Gesetz" smacks of the merely positive,
statutory, written law that he believed it was the business
of jurisprudence to dig beneath in search of the real law.
Underneath the modern and Hellenistic understanding of
nomos as mere law, according to Schmitt, we find a meaning
like the English term, "radical title." That is the possession
from which all later possession derives, and which on the
historical level means the terms on which land originally
entered the legal structure of the community. The nomos of
a territory, then, is the terms of its original appropriation,
its taking. Schmitt points out that the word is cognate with
the German "nehmen," "to take." He then goes further
and suggests, but does not attempt to prove, that nomos
is connected with "Name" (same meaning and spelling in
th
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German and English, but pronounced "nahmeh"), so that to
take a territory is to conceptualize it. This, he concludes, was
the real jurisprudential basis for the European appropriation
of the New World.
Before the Age of Discovery, there was no global law of
the earth. Each civilization might have a history, and even
an established procedure, for dealing with its barbarous
and civilized neighbors, but each such relationship was ad
hoc. Within the West, there was a sophisticated civil and
ecclesiastical law to regularize the wars and other dealings of
princes, republics, and the Church, even though the modern
notion of the state did not exist. Medieval Europe was
anarchic, but by no means lawless. The Holy Roman Empire
enjoyed a sort of preeminence in the system, but Schmitt
says its ideal characterization as a universal sovereign was an
aspect of late medieval theories about the "perfect society."
(The Church was supposed to be the other perfect society.)
Rather, Schmitt lays emphasis on the early identification of
the Empire as the "katechon," the "Restrainer" of Antichrist
mentioned in II Thessalonians 6 - 7 ; the end of the Empire
would be the end of the age.
The public law of modern Europe was continuous with
medieval law, but developed through a process in which
moral and theological content was drained from earlier
jurisprudential concepts, leaving only a formal structure.
Schmitt evinces a great respect for the early Spanish jurists,
who dismissed the arguments that the Spanish conquests in
the Americas could be justified by a grant from the emperor
or the pope, or even by the right of discovery. The indigenous
peoples had human rights to life and property that European
sovereigns could not wantonly abrogate. The conquest of the
Western Hemisphere was based on just wars nonetheless,
however, because they were in the service of an evangelical
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2009
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crusading enterprise authorized by the pope. The Spanish
and Portuguese had to exercise effective government in the
west in order to facilitate the free commerce and travel on
which missionary activity depended. This was one origin of
the concept of the "freedom of the sea."
The other was the right to piracy, which was more
congenial to the English temperament. Famously, in the
early 16 century, the pope brokered a global division of the
Spanish and Portuguese spheres of influence with a raya, or
line of longitude, that ran north to south through the whole
earth. The English version of this was the "amity line." On
the hither side of an amity line, the ordinary usages of polite
nations applied; European treaties were observed and the
private property of all travelers was respected. On the nether
side was the war of all against all. This could be limited by
particular agreements among the parties, but the rule was
that, on the high seas and on non-European soil, the rules did
not apply that applied in Europe.
The purpose of both the rayas and the amity lines was
the purpose of all international law, at least in Schmitt's
view: not the prevention of war, but the bracketing of war.
A clash on the border between two European states was
an act of war. A clash at sea or between colonies need not
be. Conversely, war in Europe need not mean war in the
colonies. Starting in the 16 century and extending even into
the twentieth, the colonial situation was an anticipation of
the dictum, "Whatever happens in Vegas, stays in Vegas."
We should note that, sometimes, Schmitt characterizes this
extra-European regime as "international law" properly so
called, and contrasts it with the "European public law" that
governed the states of Europe. Literally, of course, the latter
is an "international law," too, and Schmitt sometimes uses
th
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the term in a pre-twentieth century European context, as we
see in the book's extended title.
Within Europe, the public law of Europe in the 16 and
17 centuries used old concepts to bracket conflict. The early
modern wars of religion were wars of "just cause," fought
against enemies regarded as criminals whose destruction
was a war aim. Neutrality was not an established institution.
Societies were targeted as well as militaries. By the middle of
the 17 century, however, European jurisprudence had ended
this unsatisfactory situation. The concept of "just war," in
the sense of legally recognized war, was not abandoned, but
it became a purely formal question of legal sufficiency. The
notion of "just cause" for war was relegated to the conscience
of the belligerents. There was no discrimination between
aggressive and defensive war. The public law of Europe
was concerned only with whether the combatants were "just
enemies," a category that was increasingly limited to states.
(The later "nation state," the state that represents a people,
was a refinement of legitimacy that had surprisingly little
effect on the viability of the international system.)
The state was not a new idea, but it developed a new
significance in this period. It absorbed every kind of civil
and religious authority that had hitherto existed in the lawful
anarchy of medieval Europe. Among the things it absorbed
was the monarchies (a point that was missed, it seems to
this reviewer, by some of the dimmer monarchs, who did
not realize that their absolutist governments were displacing
them). The state was reconceptualized as a person, as an
active will, that might enter into duels with other, similar
persons, provided the duels conformed to certain recognized
forms. In a sense, each state was independent of every other,
but the independence was bracketed by understandings with
its neighbors. Neutrals were recognized to be interested
th
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parties to peace treaties, for instance, because each part of
the European public space depended for its security on a
balance of power, indeed a balance of consensus, among
the Great Powers. And of course all of Europe understood
that its internal rules did not apply at sea or in the colonies,
except to the extent the Great Powers agreed they did. Wars
were not fought against civilians or civilian infrastructure.
For that matter, during an occupation, the civil law of the
state from which the land was taken still applied. Territory
that had been generally recognized as neutral would stay
neutral when it changed hands.
The absolute state was tolerable because its claims were
limited. All of Europe had a roughly comparable system
of secure property and liberal economics. When one state
occupied another's territory, or even annexed it, there was
generally no political or social revolution, except to a limited
degree during the Napoleonic era. Treaties of peace were
understood to include amnesties for the participants on both
sides.
On the border of this system was England, which had
developed in such a way that the state was subordinate to
society. Economics and trade were the objects of English
statecraft. England's chief function in the Eurocentric
international system was the maintenance of the law of the
sea, which was essentially a system for bracketing "prize
war," the war of taking booty. England was of Europe but
not in it. Be that as it may, England's relationship to Europe
was less ambiguous, or perhaps less extreme, than that of the
United States.
We should note that Schmitt's understanding of
American (in the sense of the US) law was perhaps impeded
by interruptions in library hours during the period when this
book was written. Still, we should note that, in discussing
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol60/iss60/11
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American constitutional history, he mentions "The
Declaration of Human Rights" of 1775, a document that has
escaped this reviewer's notice. (One surprising point: Oliver
Wendell Holmes's "realist" view of law is wholly positivist
but still similar to Schmitt's Ernstfalh nonetheless, Holmes
is mentioned only in a footnote.) In any case, Schmitt makes
two chief points about the United States.
The first is that, from the time the US became prominent
in global affairs, it has applied a principle of foreign
affairs derived from Washington's Farewell Address: "As
little politics as possible; as much trade as possible." In
international relations, this means that Americans, and even
American diplomats, are usually present when important
decisions among the great powers are made, but the
American government tends to refuse to take responsibility
for political (and economic) decisions that it has influenced.
This pattern of presence-and-absence was true of the Congo
Conference of 1885, which Schmitt characterizes as the last
great act of the European system. There, the US helped to set
the terms for neutralization of Central Africa but declined to
guarantee the settlement. Famously, the US was present at
the Conference of Versailles but refused to ratify the treaty.
One might add that the US helped draft the Kyoto Protocols
and then refused to be bound by them (though one may also
note that the US actually complied with the terms of the
agreement, unlike many of the signers).
The other point is that the US, quite early in its history,
sought to make the Western Hemisphere a peculiar region of
international law, an American Grofiraum. The charter for
this sphere of influence was the Monroe Doctrine of 1823.
The motive was not that the United States did not consider
itself part of the West; on the contrary, the US tended to
consider itself the true West, to which Europe was an archaic
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2009

7

Comparative Civilizations Review, Vol. 60 [2009], No. 60, Art. 11

Book Reviews

179

and degenerate prelude. The Western Hemisphere, under the
Monroe Doctrine, thus became the hither side of an amity
line, the side on which progress and peace were possible.
The other side was consigned to chaos and Old Night.
But sometimes not. Schmitt asserts that the US was a
nation of the Calvinist elect that was also a missionary
enterprise. He notes that the notorious Calvinist, Woodrow
Wilson, wanted the League of Nations headquarters to be
placed at Geneva. (Curiously, Schmitt does not note how
this characterization dovetails with the Spanish justification
for the appropriation of the West.) The American impulse
to quarantine the reprobate to the shabby side of the planet
was always strong, but not in the long run as strong as the
impulse to redeem them through the projection of American
ideas of good international governance.
Being theoretical, these ideas necessarily took the form
of rootless universalism. Readers may infer that this impulse
was facilitated by the limited importance of the state in
American international relations. Hegel, we are reminded,
had said that there was no American state, and Schmitt
seemed to think that this assessment was still true in his
own time. Far more even than was the case with England,
American society became present in regions from which the
American state was absent, or at least absent at first.
"International law" in the modern sense began to be
introduced into Europe at the end of the 19 century. It
decentered Europe from the global system, and at the
Conference of Versailles, it destroyed European public law.
As an example of the transition, we have already noted the
nefarious Belgians. At the Congo Congress, the Congo Free
State was created by the Great Powers as an independent
entity, under the unfortunate rule of the Belgian King
Leopold. Its neutrality was recognized by a collective act
th
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of Europe, in the same way that the permanent neutrality of
Switzerland had been recognized at the Congress of Vienna
and as Belgium's own neutrality had been recognized a few
years later. In the early 20 century, however, when the
Belgium state assumed direct control of the Free State, it
refused to accept recognition by the Great Powers as the
basis for its sovereignty. Rather, Belgium based its claim on
"effective occupation."
You see the distinction. The public law of Europe did
not promise much, but what it did promise it could usually
deliver. The recognition of the Great Powers was a concrete
fact in which some confidence could be placed. In contrast,
the international law theory of "effective occupation" was just
that, a theory; essentially a debt that no one in particular was
obligated to pay. You can see why the 20 century became
unhinged. The law of the outer world, of the world beyond
the amity lines, was introduced into Europe, so that the same
rule applied on the Rhine as on the Congo. In neither place
did it work well.
International law had the effect of destroying the
bracketing mechanisms that had been the great achievement
of European jurists. The concept of "just cause" was
reintroduced, largely as part of the effort to criminalize
war in general. The status of "just enemy" was distorted
beyond all recognition. It was stripped from states that
would previously have remained parts of the international
system and accorded to rebels and revolutionaries. Heads of
state became subject to prosecution for war crimes, without
possibility of amnesty. Wars once again became wars to the
death for entire societies. To lose a war was to risk forcible
inclusion into a culturally and legally alien universe.
Clearly, the old nomos that had begun to gel in the 16
century had passed away, and something new would have to
th
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replace it. Regarding the coming nomos, as we have seen,
Schmitt offered three options. The first was some genuinely
universal system, a world government in fact if not in name.
He mentions the possibility several times, but offers no
specifics: this is clearly not his favorite choice. The option
that would entail the least change from historical experience
would be an augmented version ofmaritime hegemony. Under
this option, some power, probably the United States would
do pretty much what the Britain of Queen Victoria's day did,
but with the addition of air power. The third possibility, and
perhaps the one Schmitt finds most congenial, would be a
plurality of international systems. This is what today we
would call "multipolarity."
At least in this book, Schmitt offers few clues about which
possibility is the most likely. In a way, this is to be welcomed.
Schmitt's brand of jurisprudence is not to everybody's taste,
but at least it is not bossy, unlike the legal theory that attends
early 21 century transnationalism. Actually, the problem
with it is that it is too willing, even eager, to be bossed.
Perhaps anyone who consults Schmitt about the creation of
a new nomos should come away with this useful piece of
advice: to name is to take.
John J. Reilly
st

David Andress, The Terror: The Merciless War for
Freedom in Revolutionary France. New York: Farrar,
Strauss and Giroux, 2005.
The image of the "Reign of Terror" during the French
Revolution has captured the imagination of many historians
and has been the backdrop in works such as the Scarlet
Pimpernel, A Tale of Two Cities, and Scaramouche. Rarely,
has a comparatively brief period (September, 1793—
August, 1794) been so discussed and examined. Visions of
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